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Summary. - The purpose of this paper is to develop an understanding of the economic functions and
associated welfare implications of the cooperative associations that dominate the wholesale trade in two
staple foods. Questionnaire responses lead to several conclusions. Individual traders face incomplete
markets, imperfect information, and little government-provided institutional and physical infrastructure.
The associations are sophisticated "Coase-like" responses to this market environment: they focus on
reducing their members' transaction costs, and hence the marginal private costs of trading. Thus it is
likely that these associations enhance efficiency. We conclude with a critique of current government
policy with respect to this trade.

1. INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE
REVIEW

Most of the marketing of staple foodstuffs in
urban West Africa takes place within the "informal
sector" of the economy. This is particularly true in
Ibadan, the principal Yaruba city in western Nigeria
and the second largest urban area in the country.
Ibadan's informal-sector foodstuff traders operate in
a world of incomplete markets for credit and transport, imperfect information, and little governmentprovided institutional or physical infrastructure.
Individual wholesale traders have for decades
responded to these features of their market environment by conducting their operations within the context of cooperative associations that function in
many ways as cartels. Informal-sector foodstuff trading in Ibadan thus takes place in a setting that differs
in significant ways from that of perfect competition:
collective behavior in the marketplace has introduced a significant element of cooperation into the
foodstuff marketing process.
Although some economists tend to employ the
working hypothesis that cooperative activities are
"market imperfections" that impose deadweight losses of economic welfare upon society, others have
shown that the welfare implications of collective
behavior in the marketplace must be analyzed on a
case-by-case basis. For example, "Second Best" wel-

fare theory- as pioneered by Meade (1955) and
Lipsey and Lancaster (1956-57) and refined and utilized by many others, including Greenwald and
Stiglitz (1986, 1988) and Stiglitz (1991)- points
out that, depending on the specific market context,
noncompetitive behavior may or may not be welfarereducing. Heimberger (1964), in his classic study of
farmer marketing cooperatives, reaches the same
conclusion. He thus argues that theory alone cannot
support a general policy stance toward cooperative
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activities: the welfare consequences of a specific
instance of collective behavior can only be determined in light of the central "structural and environmental characteristics" of the relevant marketplace
(p. 617).
Following Helmberger's advice, we undertake
here a context-specific study of the economic functions, and the associated welfare implications, of the
traders' associations- known in Yoruba as egbes
- that dominate much of the wholesale foodstuff
trade in Ibadan. More specifically, we focus on the
activities of the elubo (dried yam) and lafun
(processed cassava) wholesalers' egbes, in the
attempt to discern their implications for social welfare. We conclude that the associations, which we
analyze as responses to those features of the market
environment that impinge upon the traders, may
indeed create both private benefits for their members
and net benefits for society as a whole. But present
Nigerian policy with respect to the urban informalsector foodstuff trade can be characterized as one of,
on average, open hostility and harassment. In light of
our analysis, such a policy stance may well be misguided and indeed welfare-reducing.
Since the late 1960s a tremendous amount of
research has been done, both inside and outside of
sub-Saharan Africa, that has had either a direct or
indirect influence on the present study. Below we
summarize these branches of inquiry by citing the
seminal works in each area and reporting the key
results that provide the context within which our
work can be understood.
The modern research agenda with respect to the
urban informal sector was essentially defined by
Hart (1973) - in which the term "informal sector"
first appeared in the literature - and the report of
the International Labour Office (ILO) 1972
Employment Mission to Kenya. This latter study,
indeed, galvanized the multilateral aid and development community into sponsoring a series of studies
on this sector. During the next 20 years most of the
research on the informal sector in urban Africa south
of the Sahara was carried out under the auspices of
the ILO, with the findings summarized and evaluated
in several papers, monographs, and books (e.g.,
Sethuraman, 1981; ILO-JASPA, 1985; Trager, 1987;
Turnham, Salome, and Schwarz, 1990; Lubell,
1991).
The urban informal sector in Nigeria has been
investigated extensively. The ILO, during its World
Employment Programme effort of the 1970s, studied
the informal sector in both Lagos and Kana (see
Sethuraman, 1981). Informal economic activity in
the city of Benin was examined in the mid-1970s by
a geographer (Onokerhoraye, 1977), and Ekpenyong
(1985) did extensive survey research on the informal
sector in the cities of Port Harcourt and Calabar.
Finally, Callaway ( 1967) analyzed activity within

the informal sector of Ibadan itself. Despite the fact
that Callaway's work predated both Hart's and the
ILO Kenya Mission, it had the same focus and purpose as these later studies.
All of the above studies focused upon what Nihan
(1980) first termed the "non-structured modern" subsector of the urban informal sector, which consists
primarily of manufacturing (e.g., metalworking and
woodworking), repair services (in particular mechanical and electrical repair), and construction. The
common purpose of these studies was to identify the
characteristics of and the constraints facing so-called
microenterprises in this subsector. It was hoped that
this information would then facilitate the design of
financial and technical assistance programs that
would enable the more "viable" of these production
units to contribute to employment, incomes, growth,
and development (Lubell, 1991).
These studies combined to reveal a dynamic and
productive urban informal sector in sub-Saharan
Africa that comprises 40-60% of the urban labor
force. Despite the fact that the 1972 ILO Kenya
Mission report - and in consequence many subsequent research programs - defined urban informalsector markets a priori as characterized by ease of
entry and perfectly competitive conditions, it was
discovered that "in many instances entry is not especially easy" (Lubell, 1991, p. 17). The studies cited
above - along with that of House ( 1984 ), which
focused on the informal sector in Nairobi, Kenyadescribed significant barriers to entry in many informal-sector markets, traceable to lack of access to (a)
suitable physical and institutional infrastructure (e.g.,
work premises, electricity, water, a properly functioning legal system that defines property rights and
enforces contracts), and (b) formal-sector credit
facilities.
In terms of employment, trading generally dominates the informal sector. Despite this fact, all of the
above analysts, except House and to a lesser extent
Onokerhoraye, explicitly excluded trading activities
(whether wholesale or retail) from their samples.
Most research efforts, indeed, were predicated upon
the belief that such activities were "unproductive"
and thus should not be targeted for microenterprise
support programs.
Interestingly, Onokerhoraye, Ekpenyong, and
Callaway all suggest that cooperative activities were
prevalent at various times and in various subsectors
of the informal sectors in Nigeria that they studied.
Onokerhoraye (pp. 58-59) reports that many entrepreneurs, including "different types of traders," were
organized into "guilds" in precolonial times that
"controlled entry" and "in some cases [controlled]
prices." Ekpenyong notes that some artisans marketed their products in Port Harcourt and Calabar
through "cooperative societies." In Ibadan, cooperative activities in the informal sector were, in
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Callaway's judgement, common in the 1960s: craftsmen in many trades operated in "loose cooperative
groups" or "unions" that bought inputs jointly and
shared work; associations of businessmen "pressed
for the common good"; "unions" of traders engaged
in "price fixing" and in cooperative efforts with
respect to materials purchases and marketing ( 1967,
p. 159).
Another branch of research relevant to the present study comprises the work of the economist
Boserup (1971) and anthropologists such as
Sudarkasa (1973), Hay and Stichter (1984), and
Trager (1976, 1981, 1985, 1988). These analysts
studied the economic activities of the Yoruba "market women" of western Nigeria. Each notes that
urban Yoruba female foodstuff traders belong to
market associations -Callaway's "unions," or
egbes. Trager (1981) reports more specifically that
all sellers of each commodity must belong to such an
association. In addition to stating that the egbes represent the traders' interests outside the marketplace,
Trager indicates (without further comment) that the
associations act to "settle disputes" among their
members.
The seminal studies of foodstuff marketing in
southern Nigeria and lbadan were carried out by
Hodder (1967), Gusten (1968), and Jones (1972).
Each study (and Hodder's in particular) focused on
the anatomy of the location- and time-specific "markets" - known in Yoruba as oja - in lbadan and its
hinterlands. Gusten concerned himself with the foodstuff marketing chain, and traces carefully the flows
of foodstuffs into Ibadan from rural areas. Gusten
and Hodder together identify the specialized wholesale foodstuff markets in lbadan, and describe rather
than analyze the activities that take place within
them.
Jones (1972) moves beyond Gusten and Hodder
to develop, in his words, an "economic appraisal" of
the efficiency of the foodstuff marketing system in
southern Nigeria, in order to provide a context within which governmental interventions can be evaluated. He employs the model of perfect competition as
a benchmark against which he evaluates the efficiency implications of the actual conditions under which
trading occurs, and examines the behavior of the
existing price series. He concludes that in general the
foodstuff marketing process in southern Nigeria is
perfectly competitive, although he cautions that
"generalizations about African marketing may be
misleading when applied to a paiticular commodity"
(1972, p. 6).
Nevertheless, Jones notes the presence of what he
calls "guild-type organizations" or "trade associations" to which many traders belong. Indeed, he calls
them a "feature" of the marketing landscape in
southern Nigeria (p. 108). Their "leaders are frequently honored and respected," and they "may
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restrict entry into a commodity trade to some extent
and also regulate trading practices." But, given the
"large size" of the markets in question and the numbers of traders involved, Jones concludes that these
associations probably do not significantly alter the
competitive nature of the foodstuff marketing
process (p. 105).
In sum, many of the seminal studies on Nigeria
and Ibadan identify -as we do -the existence of
cooperative associations of traders, whether they are
termed "unions," "guilds," or egbes. Collective
behavior among traders in the urban informal sectors
of Nigeria has thus been present for decades. But
none of the studies cited above examines these associations in any direct way as economic entities pursuing their activities within particular economic and
institutional contexts. Our work, therefore, contributes to each of the above research traditions in a
substantive way.
In a broader context, this study can be viewed as
contributing to the literature on what we can call
"the private and social advantages of collective
behavior in the marketplace." This literature consists
of many diverse strands. 1 For example, it includes
work on the coordination of economic activity within the firm and more broadly on the determinants of
organizational structure (e.g., Coase, 1937, 1960;
Arrow, 1964, 1969, 1974; Williamson, 1985, 1986;
Ben-Ner, Brada, and Neuberger, 1993; Ben-Ner,
Montias, and Neuberger, 1993). Another line of
inquiry focuses on interfirm or interagent cooperation in developed countries (e.g., Arrow, 1974; the
work by Brusco (1982) and Capecchi (1989) on the
informal sector in the Emilia-Romagna region of
Italy during the post-WWII period; Purvis's 1990
study of cooperative societies in 19th-century
England and Wales). Finally, this literature encompasses studies of the social structures prevalent in
Third World urban informal sectors that enable their
members to minimize the risks of doing business in a
low-income and uncertain world (e.g., Papanek,
197 5; Doeringer, 1986; Jagannathan, 1987).
In the light of this broadly defined research tradition, the elubo and lafun wholesalers' associations in
Ibadan can be viewed as the social structures within
which cooperative arrangements between individual
traders are developed and maintained. Within their
egbes, individual traders acquire "social assets" (in
the language of Arrow, 1974; Doeringer, 1986; and
Jagannathan, 1987) such as loyalty, friendship, and
trust. These assets, in turn, enable the members to
segment the marketplace in significant ways, and
hence to garner economic benefits that would otherwise be unobtainable. Specifically, association members dominate the wholesale distribution of elubo
and lafun in lbadan, because first, they control the
traders' access to the urban oja in which these products are sold, and second, the egbes prevent non-
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member traders from acquiring inventory, namely
elubo and lafun, in the rural oja surrounding the city.
Yet the associations do not regulate urban selling
prices. Nor do they enforce sales quotas. Instead, the
egbes concentrate on decreasing their members'
transaction costs. In particular, the associations
reduce the marginal private costs of trading by
expanding their members' access to transport and
credit facilities, collecting and disseminating to
members information that individual traders find too
expensive to acquire on their own, and providing,
where the government does not, the necessary institutional and physical market infrastructure.
Thus it is possible that these egbes generate profits for their members, provide public goods for society as a whole, and enable more trading - at lower
prices - to take place in the urban markets. In this
situation, as in others cited by Jagannathan (1987),
Brusco (1982), Capecchi (1989), and Doeringer
( 1986), there may well be no conflict between the
pursuit of private gain and social welfare.
The plan of this paper is as follows. In section 2
we describe the informal-sector distribution system
for elubo and lafun in Ibadan, and the market setting
within which the urban wholesalers operate. We also
describe the methodology used in our study, and discuss some of the central characteristics of our sample. Section 3 contains an analysis of egbe operations in both the urban and rural marketplaces. A
more formal, graphical treatment of egbe behavior
and its welfare implications is presented in section 4.
We conclude by summarizing our results and discussing their implications for development policy.

2. THE MARKETING CHAIN, THE RESEARCH
SAMPLE, AND THE MARKET ENVIRONMENT
(a) The marketing chain

The process by which elubo and lafun are marketed in Ibadan today remains virtually unchanged
from that observed by Hodder, Gus ten, and Jones.
Fresh yams and/or cassava are grown by farmers in
the rural hinterlands of western Nigeria, and then
sold directly to "primary wholesalers." These agents
process the raw produce into elubo or lafun, bulk
these products for sale, and supply them in the rural
"periodic markets" (oja that meet at regular intervals
- most often every fourth or eighth day - throughout rural Yorubaland). "Secondary wholesalers"
from urban areas such as Ibadan enter these rural oja
on the demand side, and purchase these products in
"bags" (large burlap sacks that weigh 250-300
pounds when filled), the same units of measure
noted by Hodder. The rural periodic markets are in
general quite a distance from Ibadan: Gusten reported in 1966 that the average distance from these mar-

kets to the city proper was 90 miles (p. 153), and
rural buying trips today often take days to complete.
The urban traders thus rely on hired lorry transport
-just as they did in the 1960s - to deliver their
purchases to their stalls in the specialized wholesale
foodstuff markets.
There are five of these foodstuff oja in Ibadan:
from the largest to the smallest they are Bodija,
Oritamerin, Owode Academy, Oje, and Sasa. 2 Each
are what Hodder terms "day" markets: they are open
seven days a week, including holidays, from sunrise
to after sunset. These markets are typically jammed
with customers and very noisy. As noted earlier,
each market operates in a geographically distinct
location, and the travel time from one to another, via
bus, can often be as much as 90 minutes.
The secondary wholesalers sell elubo and lafun in
these markets to both retail traders and consumers.
Sales to retail traders are generally made in the
aforementioned "bags." The typical unit of retail sale
for lafun is the officially sanctioned congo, a plastic
mass-produced bowl about six inches in diameter.
Elubo is not sold retail in any standardized measure,
but rather is stacked or piled into whatever the seller
has by way of tins or baskets. 3 Retailers of both
products sometimes grind them into flour, which
they then sell in congos. A consumer, however, may
purchase unground pieces of elubo or lafun and
employ the services of one of the grinders in the
marketplace.
In sum, the marketing chain for these products
consists of the following linkages: farmer/producer
->rural "primary wholesaler" (processer/assembler) -> urban "secondary wholesaler" -> retailer
or consumer. These products thus typically change
hands about four times, and thus the marketing chain
is essentially identical to that described by Gusten
and Jones in the 1960s: Gusten notes (p. 69), and
Jones concurs (pp. 90-95), that most staple foods
"changed hands between two and a half and four
times," with the average being "somewhat more than
three turnovers."
(b) Characteristics of our research sample

In this study we focus on the activities of the secondary, or urban, wholesalers. Our working definition of a "secondary wholesaler" is
a person who goes to the rural periodic markets to buy
in "bags" and who sells his or her product - to at least
some customers- in "bags."

To ascertain how many of these traders operate in
the marketplace, we operationalized this definition to
read as follows:
a "secondary wholesaler" is a person who has at least
one "bag" in his or her storage pile.
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Table 1. Numbers of urban wholesalers in lbadan

Market
Bodija
Oritamerin
Owode Academy
Oje

Sasa

Number of lafun
wholesalers

Number of elubo

80-90
90
15-20

70-80
100
2
0
2

8
3

wholesalers

The numbers of urban wholesalers in each market, based upon two separate counts, are given in
Table 1.4
The method we used to study the characteristics
and the activities of these traders was ethnographic.
During the summer of 1991 we gathered the raw
data through a process of observation and both formal and informal questioning of egbe leaders and
rank-and-file members. In addition, we were allowed
to attend three meetings of the Oritamerin elubo
wholesalers' association.
Our formal interviewing activity consisted of
administering a questionnaire to 75 traders, a sample
that comprised at least 10% of the lafun and elubo
wholesalers in each of the five markets. 5 More
specifically, 40 of these traders sold lafun, 30 sold
elubo, and five were market-wide or city-wide association leaders who sold other commodities such as
rice, beans, or onions. During these interviews we
focused on each seller's personal history, membership in his or her egbe, and how the association
influences his or her business. We also asked each
wholesaler about his or her access to rural-urban
transport, the ways in which he or she saves and
obtains credit, and his or her long-term aspirations.
Those traders in leadership positions were asked
some additional questions that were tailored specifically for them.
In order to overcome the language barrier, we
used both English and Y aruba versions of each question. Furthermore, we were able to administer the
questionnaires with the aid of a translator who was
an experienced field researcher at the International
Institute for Tropical Agriculture (IITA) in lbadan
and fluent in both languages.
The typical trader in our sample is 41 years of
age, female, and illiterate.6 Family members (including most of her school-age children) and apprentices
help her conduct her business. She has few (if any)
physical assets, does not own a car or a bicycle, and
wears inexpensive clothes. She works seven days a
week, and thus has little leisure time.
She sells either lafun or elubo to both retail
traders and consumers. About 50% of our sample
said that they earn over half of their income from
sales to consumers, roughly 10% of the wholesalers
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earn equal amounts of income from consumers and
retail traders, and the rest earn most of their income
from sales to retail traders. In rough terms, this selling breakdown is comparable to that reported by
Jones in the late 1960s.

(c) The market environment: Salient characteristics

We characterize the market environment within
which the urban wholesalers operate as "Nth-Best,"
for the markets for credit and rural-urban transport
are incomplete, information is imperfect, and there is
little government-provided institutional or physical
infrastructure.' As a result, the transaction costs (and
hence the marginal private costs) of doing business
as an individual, atomistic trader in this environment
exceed those that would be incurred by a trader 1in a
world in which information dissemination is perfect,
markets are complete, and the government provides
adequate institutional and physical infrastructure.
Access to rural-urban transport is problematic.
Independent traders often cannot obtain such transport, due both to their "smallness" and to the fact
that this service, heavily dependent upon flows of
imported spare parts, is subject to periodic disruption. Moreover, on the occasions when independent
traders can get transport, they are unable to insure
their shipments against loss or damage.
The credit market is also incomplete. Indeed,
most traders do not have access to formal-sector
credit facilities: 59 out of the 63 respondents stated
that they do not receive credit from commercial
banks or other formal-sector institutions. The formal
sector has several reasons for not extending loans to
these agents. The typical trader is illiterate and cannot provide a bank with written business records,
does not possess acceptable collateral (e.g., land or
accumulated bank deposits), and demands small,
short-term loans that a bank is often unwilling to
provide. The traders, for their part, are generally
uninterested in obtaining formal-sector credit, even
when it is available. 8 Traders, usually with literate
friends, must sacrifice significant amounts of time
(and hence potential sales revenue) in order to travel
to a bank's premises during official business hours
and complete loan transactions.
These wholesalers, however, depend heavily
upon credit. Access to this resource loosens a binding constraint upon trading activity: more credit
enables a wholesaler to engage in more trading per
time period because he or she is able to hire more
apprentices, buy more bags, tins, baskets, and congas, make larger rural purchases, and cover the additional transport costs. 9 Increased access to credit, furthermore, permits members to insure themselves
against short-term fluctuations in demand and/or cost
conditions.
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In Ibadan, as elsewhere, information is not a free
good. Indeed, the lafun and elubo wholesalers face
significant opportunity costs when collecting information on prices, costs, and other market conditions.
The time required to travel between the urban markets and to and from the rural markets translates into
lost sales revenue. Consequently, individual traders
operate under conditions of imperfect information.
Finally, there is a pervasive lack of governmentprovided infrastructure. The authorities devote little
or no time and resources to road maintenance, the
building of drainage ditches, and other marketplace
needs such as electricity and running water. The
government also provides little in the way of institutional infrastructure. For example, in both the rural
and urban marketplaces official judicial authority is
often nonexistent or indifferent to criminal activity
and marketplace disputes of all sorts, including those
over property rights. In one respect the legal system
cannot extend its reach into the informal sector, due
to a lack of human, physical, and financial resources;
in another respect it chooses not to, due to the lack of
large accumulated surpluses that can be extracted via
bribery and corruption. As a result, the wholesale
foodstuff trade in Ibadan's informal sector is carried
out in an "alegal" environment.
This situation, according to Hugon (1990), is typical of that prevailing throughout sub-Saharan Africa
today. King (1990a) also emphasizes this fact, and
points out (p. 143) that in Africa the state is in
"increasingly obvious retreat from its earlier goal of
providing services [such as] transport, education, and
even law." Indeed, King argues that neither the state
nor the "formal" ("modernized") sector of the typical
African economy can even "aspire to provide" much
institutional and physical infrastructure "in the foreseeable future" (1990a, p. 145).
3. THE EGBES AND THEIR ACTIVITIES IN
THE MARKETPLACE
(a) The wholesalers' associations

Commodity-specific egbes, including those for
the lafun and elubo wholesalers, meet weekly in
each of the five urban oja. 10 In addition, a larger
umbrella organization, comprised of the leaders of
all the commodity-specific egbes, operates in each
market. There is also a citywide distributors' group
- the Ibadan Foodstuff Sellers Association - that
meets occasionally to address common concerns
among the sellers of different commodities. Two of
the objectives of this organization, as stated in its
Constitution (pp. 2-3), are "to promote Unity and
Solidarity among the business members" and "to coordinate and intensify their collaboration and efforts
to achieve a better life."

As noted earlier, we were allowed to attend a few
meetings of the Oritamerin elubo wholesalers' association. The members of this egbe elect their leaders,
who (as in all the groups we studied) remain fulltime traders, receive no compensation other than
respect and prestige, and cannot impose their will
upon the· group, for all decisions are made by consensus. Meetings are held weekly, usually last from
two to three hours, and begin and end in group
prayer. During the summer of 1991 members chose
to pay a special fee that went toward the purchase of
matching outfits.
In these ways this egbe, like similar social structures cited in Papanek (1975), Doeringer (1986),
Jagannathan (1987), and Purvis (1990), provides an
arena within which the traders create and maintain a
"group identity," or in the language of Ben-Ner,
Montias, and Neuberger (1993), an "organizational
culture." The social and religious unity Clearly present within this institution, and in particular the
respect accorded its leaders, indicate that social
cohesion is strong. Furthermore, these social relations have value in the marketplace: this egbe (along
with the others studied), translates its "social assets"
into specific economic benefits.
(b) Barriers to entry

The egbes have used their social assets to maintain, over at least the past two decades, a two-layered
barrier to entry into the urban wholesale trade in
elubo and lajun. In order to sell wholesale, a trader
must first be able to obtain selling space in the urban
oja, and second, must have access to the elubo and
lafun made available for sale by the "primary wholesalers" in the rural periodic markets. But the egbes
limit access to urban selling locations to members in
good standing who pay both a registration fee and
weekly dues. According to our survey responses, the
associations seek further to insure their monopoly
over urban sales by preventing nonmembers from
buying elubo and lafun in the rural markets surrounding Ibadan: a photo-identification card issued
by the lbadan Foodstuff Sellers Association is, in
general, necessary in order to make rural-market purchases.
The associations enforce these entry barriers by
confiscating the elubo and/or lafun bought by nonmembers and by boycotting rural vendors who
refuse to do business with egbe members on the
associations' terms. The social cohesion among the
members, forged so carefully in the context of the
egbes, makes this enforcement activity (or "defense
technology," in the terminology of Jagannathan,
1987) effective. 11 Indeed, during the summer of 1991
we encountered only one active nonmember wholesaler across all five urban oja, and she wished to
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remain anonymous for fear of being detected by the
associations. Hence the rural wholesalers do not
have a market for their products outside of the egbe
membership, and confiscation activity does not take
much time and effort. Furthermore, in the "alegal"
environment within which these markets operate
neither nonmembers nor rural vendors are able to
obtain recourse from the egbes' decisions within the
official legal system.
The associations exploit their favored access to
the rural markets by specifying maximum buying
prices and eliminating bidding among members for
the products. Indeed, 47 of the traders in our sample
stated explicitly that their association engages in
these regulatory activities. Moreover, when we asked
the sellers if their association has any "influence
over buying prices," 49 of the 67 lafun and elubo
wholesalers who answered this question replied
either "much" or "some."
The egbes most often deal with members who
flout the rural-market regulations, do not pay their
fees and dues, or in general violate group rules, by
fining them. Sometimes the egbes prevent such
members from selling in the urban market for a period of time (e.g., through confiscation of product).
Several rank-and~file members also reported that the
associations on occasion revoke the rural buying
privileges of rule-breakers for up to three months.
Indeed, during the summer of 1991 one member of
the Oritamerin elubo wholesalers' egbe was found
guilty of "rudeness" to the Chair and subsequently
had his rural buying privileges suspended. He violated this sanction, was reported to the association, and
during one of the meetings we were allowed to
attend, we watched as he pleaded his case before the
group. The members refused to lift the buying
restriction, and moreover fined him 100-200 Naira
(a sum that represents 50-100 meals for many of the
traders). As Doeringer (1986) notes, such sanctions
levied within the group tend to have a feedback
effect on group cohesion and hence strengthen the
egbes in their efforts to segment the marketplace.

ts sur-

issued
is, in
et pur-

1

by
y nons who
on the
1ng the
of the
lefense
1athan,
•f 1991
wholebed to

ICfS

(c) Price and quantity regulation

Throughout our questioning, we uncovered no
evidence that the egbes attempt to regulate sales, and
only weak evidence that they have influence over
their members' selling prices.'2 Furthermore, at no
time during the association meetings that we attended did the subjects of selling-price regulation and/or
quantity-restriction arise.
Indeed, even if the egbes wanted to regulate their
members' selling prices, or enforce sales quotas,
there are ample reasons why they would be unsuccessful. For example, product quality can vary significantly from transaction to transaction. In addi-
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tion, the measures used in the urban marketplace are
only imperfectly standardized. Prices and quantities,
furthermore, are influenced both by the bargaining
that dominates the interactions between buyers and
sellers and by the existence of personalized clientele
relationships that are known in Y aruba as onibara,
or "regular customer," ties. In this context, effective
selling-price regulation and/or quantity restrictions would be very difficult, if not impossible, to
enforce.

(d) Reduction of transaction costs

The egbes utilize their "social assets" not just to
create and maintain barriers to entry into urban
wholesale trading, but also to reduce their members'
transaction costs. More specifically, the egbes reduce
the marginal private costs incurred by their members
by:
- Expanding their access to rural-urban transport,
- Expanding their access to credit,
- Improving the flow of information in the marketplace,
- Providing both physical and institutional market infrastructure.
The egbes enable their members to obtain
rural-urban transport by contracting with the transporters, through bargaining, for their services. These
arrangements also provide for insurance: as pointed
out by the Chair of the Ibadan Foodstuff Sellers
Association, if any transporter loses or damages a
member's bag(s), the association ensures that the
transporter reimburses the member fully.
Furthermore, the egbes act as "transporters of last
resort" whenever there is a disruption in regular service. The association leadership, in these situations,
devotes .time and energy - time and energy that
individual traders do not have- to seeking out
transport alternatives.
.
The market associations also expand their members' access to credit. Indeed, one of the egbes' central functions is to provide emergency lines of credit
for all members who pay their dues. This function,
mentioned repeatedly by the leaders we interviewed,
is spelled out explicitly in the Constitution of the
Ibadan Foodstuff Sellers Association. "Objective
Eight" (p. 3) reads as follows:
The members shall coordinate and hannonize their gen~
eral policies especially in the following fields: ...
assisting members financially or otbeiWise during times
of difficulty and whenever necessary.

The "social assets" acquired by traders in the
context of their egbes, furthermore, enable the mem-
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bers to group themselves into well-functioning
"Rotating Savings and Credit Associations"
(RoSCAs), institutions that are ubiquitous in the
developing world, and that are known as ajos in
Yoruba. 13 Association members have a great deal of
information about each other and their business
activities, and hence have little or no difficulty even in the context of a relatively large ajo - in
screening potential borrowers and monitoring credit
usage. Furthermore, there is no enforcement problem, for the costs of default are significant. The borrower, in effect, puts up his or her social standing,
business reputation, and business contacts as collateral.
Egbe activity also enhances the dissemination of
information in the marketplace. The associations'
regulatory activities in the rural markets and contractual arrangements with transporters enable their
members to have greater information concerning
rural purchase prices and transport costs, and hence
to some extent prices in urban markets other than
their own. 14 In addition, the market-wide and citywide umbrella association meetings provide a forum
for the sharing of information concerning rural and
urban market conditions. In particular, they provide
the commodity-specific egbes with the information
necessary to plan and coordinate their activities in
the rural marketplace and in the market for ruralurban transport: eight of the 10 association leaders
who responded to the question "What do you discuss
with the leaders of the other associations at your
meetings?" replied "buying prices" and "transport
costs/problems."
Finally, the market-wide "umbrella" egbes provide, where the government does not, both physical
and institutional marketplace infrastructure. For
example, membership dues finance night-time security services, road maintenance, and the construction
of drainage ditches. During 1991, as it has done in
the past, the Bodija Foodstuff Sellers Association
paid 15,000 Naira (roughly $1,070-$1,500, at the
range of "bureau de change" exchange rates we
encountered during the summer of that year) to
regrade the roads - none of which the government
paves or maintains - in and near the market.
Beyond these activities, the Ibadan Foodstuff Sellers
Association regularly lobbies the local and state governments for general marketplace improvements.
The umbrella associations also exercise judicial
power in areas where the local authorities do not.
The local police, for instance, routinely refer cases of
alleged theft and other petty crimes that occur in the
markets to these groups. In addition, as discussed in
section 3(b) the egbes themselves create and defend
property rights for their members in the five specialized wholesale foodstuff markets of Ibadan. This
activity translates. into cost reductions for members

because first, it reduces the time and effort individuals must expend, on a daily basis, to defend their
market locations, and second, it makes rural buying
trips less costly, due to the decreased probability of
locational "expropriation" by other traders while
members are absent from their urban oja.
In sum, we conclude that the egbes reduce the
transaction costs, and hence the marginal private
costs, associated with wholesaling elubo and lafun in
the urban marketplace to a significant degree. The
associations expand their members' access to transport and credit facilities. They also create, in the terminology of Arrow (1974), "information channels"
through which "signals" as to market developments
can be received, and they "coordinate" these signals
through internal "communication channels." Thus
the associations collect, process, and disseminate
information that individual traders find too expensive to acquire on their own. Finally, the egbes provide their members with both physical and institutional market infrastructure.

4. A FORMAL ANALYSIS OF EGBE ACTIVITY
In this section we translate the above analysis
into a more formal, graphical model that highlights
some of the salient features of the urban and rural
markets and enables us to show the conditions under
which egbe activity contributes to social welfare. We
demonstrate the possibility that when the urban
traders form an association that both restricts access
to the rural market and concentrates on reducing the
transaction costs of its members, the urban market
price falls, the quantity bought and sold in the city
rises, and net social benefits increase.
Consider first a world in which information dissemination is perfect, markets are complete, the government provides adequate physical and institutional
market infrastructure, and perfect competition prevails. The marginal private cost schedule that individual urban wholesalers face when trading either
elubo or lafun - here considered to be one product,
good "x" - in this world is denoted in Figures 1 and
2 as MPC 1• But, as discussed in section 2, the urban
traders operate in a very different environment, one
we have labelled as "Nth-Best," in which the transaction costs of doing business as an atomistic agent
are significantly higher. The marginal private cost
curve in this latter world, depicted as MPCN in these
graphs, thus lies above MPC 1•
In Figure 1, which depicts market equilibrium in
the absence of all egbe activity, the quantity bought
and sold in the urban market is Q0, as determined by
the intersection of the urban market demand curve
D 0 u and MPCN, and the equilibrium price is P 0u.
(Some loss of product occurs during transport, so Q 0
is less than the amount bought by the wholesalers in

Figure l. The rural mar)
urban market for good -'
all association activity.

the rural market, Q0
under these circumsta1
a deadweight loss oj
represented by the s
panel.
Suppose now that
themselves into an
restricts access to goo
acts as a monopsoni
quantity purchased i
equate the marginal j
marginal revenue pro
The quantity sold in d
(some loss of produc
and the price rises to
section D 0u and S 1u.
clearly, welfare-reduc
Now let this egbe
reducing activities de
acting as a rnonopso1
of distributing goo1
decline. Consequent!
ward. In addition, tl
during transport. Se'
the worst-case seen:

fort individudefend their
rural buying
>robability of
raders while

CARTELS IN AN "NTH-BEST" WORLD

331

sr
0

1.

1s reduce the

ginal private
and lafun in
: degree. The
cess to translte, in the ter.on channels"
developments
these signals
mnels." Thus
l disseminate
1d too expenhe egbes prot! and institu-

1

E ACTIVITY

bove analysis
:hat highlights
:ban and rural
nditions under
al welfare. We
1en the urban
·estricts access
n reducing the
urban market
old in the city

formation distplete, the govGd institutional
rnpetition pre:dule that inditrading either
)e one product,
1 Figures l and
on 2, the urban
vironment, one
1hich the transatomistic agent
tal private cost
MPCN in these

: equilibrium in
::J.uantity bought
; determined by
. demand curve
m price is P0u.
transport, so Qo
! wholesalers in

Figure 1. The rural market for good x (top panel) and the
urban market for good x (bottom panel) in the absence of
all association activity.

Figure 2. Rural market (top panel) and urban market (bottom panel) equilibria when the traders' association is
active.

the rural market, Q0 r.) The equilibrium outcome
under these circumstances thus has associated with it
a deadweight loss of economic welfare, which is
represented by the shaded triangle in the bottom
panel.
Suppose now that the urban wholesalers organize
themselves into an association that effectively
restricts access to good x in the rural market, i.e., that
acts as a monopsonist. The egbe will reduce the
quantity purchased in the rural market in order to
equate the marginal factor cost of x, MFC, with its
marginal revenue product D 0r, as shown in Figure 2.
The quantity sold in the urban market thus falls to Q1
(some loss of product still occurs during transport),
and the price rises to P 1u, as determined by the intersection D 0 u and S1u. This equilibrium outcome is,
clearly, welfare-reducing.
Now let this egbe engage in the transaction costreducing activities described in section 3, while still
acting as a monopsonist. The marginal private costs
of distributing good x in the urban market thus
decline. Consequently, S1u in Figure 2 shifts downward. In addition, there is now no loss of product
during transport. Several outcomes are possible. In
the worst-case scenario, the association's monop-

sony activity dominates the reduction in transaction
costs. The urban supply curve thus shifts, for example, to S2u, and the net effect of the traders' collective
behavior in the marketplace is a decline in urban
welfare: at the equilibrium point E 2, the quantity
bought and sold is less than Q0 , and the urban market
price is above P 0u.
The decline in transaction costs, however, may be
so significant that the urban supply curve shifts
down to S3u. In this case, on a net basis the egbes are
welfare-enhancing. The market equilibrium quantity
at E3 exceeds Q0 , the price received in the urban
market -(P3u) is lower than P0u, and the rural primary
wholesalers sell more, at a higher price, than in the
absence of all egbe activity. The shaded area in the
bottom panel of Figure 2 represents the efficiency
gain in the urban market in this scenario.

5. CONCLUSIONS
The results obtained in section 4 indicate that
cooperation among firms in the marketplace, when
focused to a significant degree upon minimizing the
riskiness of conducting business as an independent
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entity, can be welfare-enhancing. Yet the above
analysis should be considered but a first step in the
process of determining the efficiency advantages of
the wholesale foodstuff traders' associations in
Ibadan, Nigeria.
The analysis in section 4, indeed, may significantly underestimate the welfare-enhancing capabilities of these cooperative associations, for three reasons. First, recall from section 2 that in the absence
of the egbes individual traders often cannot obtain
access to rural-urban transport, let alone insure their
shipments against loss or damage. As a result, the
actual increase in the equilibrium quantity bought
and sold in the urban marketplace due to association
activity, compared to the increase depicted in
Figures 1 and 2, is probably much greater. 15 Second,
the model of section 4 takes no account of the fact
that, for any given amount of product bought and
sold in the urban markets, social welfare rises in the
presence of egbe activity simply because these
groups provide, where the municipal authorities in
Ibadan do not, public goods such as roads, drainage
ditches, and a legal framework. Finally, in section 4
we take at face value our respondents' comments on
the effectiveness of the associations' monopsonyenforcement efforts in the rural marketplaces. If
these groups, contrary to their claims as recorded in
our questionnaire data (and contrary to our informal
observations), are in fact unable to exert significant
control over access to elubo and lafun in the rural
periodic markets, then it is even more likely that
egbe activity results in additional net benefits for
society as a whole. 16
Despite the necessarily preliminary nature of our
study, some specific policy recommendations can be
derived. In recent years the Nigerian policy stance
toward the urban informal sector as a whole - similar to the one prevailing throughout most of subSaharan Africa today- can be characterized at best
as ambivalent, on average as one of "not so benign
neglect," and at worst as one of open hostility and
harassment (Lubell, 1991, p. 76; Trager, 1987). The
Nigerian government, in sum, tends to vacillate
between ignoring this sector as a whole, actively
suppressing certain informal economic activities, and
actively promoting other specific subsectors of the
informal economy.
For example, in 1987 the government launched a
heralded "National Open Apprenticeship Scheme"
(NOAS), in the attempt to support the traditional
informal-sector apprenticeship system (King,
1990b). But NOAS was targeted only at microenterprises in Nihan's "nonstructured modem" subsector
of the informal economy, and thus was similar to the
microenterprise support programs promulgated
under the auspices of the multilateral aid community
throughout the developing world in the late 1970s

and early 1980s (as discussed in section 1).
When it has addressed itself to the urban informal-sector foodstuff trade in recent years, however,
the Nigerian government has focused on suppression. For example, the national authorities launched
a "War Against Indiscipline" in 1984, that incorporated a program of "environmental sanitation" in the
cities (Trager, 1987). Streets were cleared of informal sector market stalls; workshops and sheds located along main roads were dismantled; inventories of
traders and food vendors were confiscated. As late as
1990 the government was still waging this campaign: during that year the authorities demolished
the historically largest and most important informal
sector market in Ibadan - the Dugbe market - in
order to make room for formal sector businesses
such as commercial banks.
Moreover, the Nigerian government tends to look
upon informal sector trading activity as something to
be taxed. Indeed, one bit of irony resulting from the
attention devoted to the urban informal sector
throughout sub-Saharan Africa during the 1970s and
early 1980s is that, in the face of mounting evidence
that this sector is productive and dynamic, governments such as Nigeria's have come to view this sector as "primarily a source of tax collections
and [hence] informal sector participants [have
become] tax evaders [our emphasis]" (Lubell, 1991,
p. 114).
To cite just one example of this attitude, a year or
two ago the municipal authorities in Ibadan built a
new foodstuff market (Bodija). But they devoted as
few resources as possible to its construction (the
infrastructure of this market was crumbling during
the summer of 1991), and the market was laid out so
as to make it easier to tax the activity within. Indeed,
officials attempt to collect a tax on every single bag
of produce that gets traded in Bodija, and in the
other informal sector markets.
Our analysis indicates that such policies are precisely those the government should not implement, if
it wants to generate increases in employment,
incomes, and living standards for the majority of its
urban citizens. Furthermore, to the extent that policy
is influenced by "first-best" welfare analysis and
attempts are made to promote competitive market
conditions, societal welfare may be reduced. In the
"Nth-best" world in which urban wholesaling takes
place, the traders' associations - egbes - which
indeed are responses to this particular environment,
may well be efficiency-enhancing.
Therefore, it may well be optimal for the government simply to allow the egbes to continue operating
as they do now, and focus instead on complementing
the associations' activities by, for example, developing the communications network, paving and maintaining major roads and highways, making more for-
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for society as a whole, it may be best for it to work
with the egbes, in accord with its own areas of comparative advantage, and not against them.
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NOTES

1. In presenting the citations below, we make no
attempt to be comprehensive, given the vast amount of
work done in this general area. Rather, we seek here to
acknowledge the material that has enriched our own work
in a substantive way.
2. The market we identify as "Oritamerin" is really a
conglomeration of several markets that Hodder labels
the "Gege-Oritamerin-Oja Iba" marketing complex,
and which Gusten terms the "Mapo Hill" marketing
complex. This complex dominated the wholesale foodstuff trade in the late 1960s; its present ranking as the
second largest foodstuff market in Ibadan indicates how
similar the current foodstuff marketing process in Ibadan is
to the process described by Hodder (1967) and Gusten
(1968).
3. The congo was developed by the traders' associations
in conjunction with the government, and can be used
because pieces of lafun are small and uniform. Elubo
pieces, however, are large and irregular. Hence the lack of
standardized selling measures for this product.
4. These numbers are approximate because some traders
might not have been present during the counts, due to illness or rural buying trips.
5. Not all of the 75 traders, however, answered each and
every one of our questions.
6. To put the typical trader's age in perspective, life
expectancy at birth in Nigeria today is roughly 50-55 years.
With respect to education, the average number of years of
schooling of the 58 traders who answered this question was
2.70. Indeed, 33 of these people said that they had no education at all.
7. Note that this does not make these particular markets
especially "different" from other urban informal sector
markets in Africa and the developing world: the key
features of the Ibadan informal sector market environment that we isolate here are similar to those uncovered in
much of the Third World urban informal sector work, in
particular the African studies, cited and summarized in section 1.
8. Of the 15 traders who revealed to us their preferred
source of credit, none indicated that it was a commercial
bank.

belong instead to egbes in the larger markets. For example,
the lafun traders in Sasa are members of the lafun wholesalers' association in Bodija.
11. Ben-Ner, Montias, and Neuberger (1993), writing in
the "organizational economics" tradition, also recognize
that social cohesion - which they discuss in terms of
"organizational culture" - is critical for effective enforcement of the organization's "internal rules." They point out
that the controllers of an organization may manipulate its
culture in order to "modify self-interest" (the root of socalled agency-managerial problems) as part of their attempt
to maintain effective enforcement mechanisms (pp. 211,
222).
12. We asked the wholesale association leaders in our
sample if the egbes tried to "keep prices the same among
[their] sellers." In response, the leaders claimed only that
sometimes they required their members to use standardized
measures when selling, and that they did not regulate prices
directly. Furthermore, the traders in our sample were asked
if their egbe had any "influence over selling prices." Thirtyfive percent of the respondents said "none," 22% answered
"little," 30% replied "some," and only 14% said "much."
Two points must be made about the traders who answered
"some" and "much." First, it is possible that these respondents were confusing wholesale and retail prices.
Occasionally the retail price for a congo of lafun was
set daily, and 81% of this subgroup sold at least some
lafun on a retail basis. Second, these traders may have
answered as they did on the basis of the egbes' success at
standardizing their measures and influencing their costs of
production, and hence their responses may not reflect any
direct attempt at all by the associations to control selling
prices.
13. These RoSCAs are groups of people who contribute
regularly (usually weekly) to a fund that is distributed as a
lump sum to individuals in the group on a rotating basis.
Forty-three of the 63 respondents said that they belonged to
an ajo. The sizes of these groups ranged from 10 to 100,
with the average size being 29 people.
14. Of those traders who said that they do know the
prices of their products in other markets, 25% based their
knowledge on the dissemination of cost information that
results from the associations' exertion of market power in
the rural areas.

9. When we asked the traders in our sample what they
would do if they had "all the credit they wanted," 62 of the
63 respondents said "Expand the business/operate on a
larger scale."

15. More generally, given the data at our disposal, we
were unable to quantify the extent to which the presence of
the egbes increases the availability of elubo and lafun in the
urban markets simply due to their contractual arrangements
with the transporters.

10.

16.

In some cases, wholesalers in the smaller markets

We were unable during our field research to collect
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any primary data on the structure of the rural periodic marketplaces. A more complete study of the efficiency advantages of the urban egbes would, of course, have to include

an analysis of such data. Future research visits to Nigeria
and Ibadan are planned, therefore, in hopes of correcting
this deficiency.

REFERENCES
Adams, Dale W., "Taking a fresh look at informal finance,"
in Phillipe Callier (Ed.), Financial Systems and
Development in Africa (Washington, DC: World Bank,
1991), pp. 29-42.
Arrow, Kenneth J., The Limits of Organization (New York:
W. W. Norton & Company, 1974).
Arrow, Kenneth J., "The organization of economic activity:
Issues pertinent to choice of market versus nonmarket
allocation," in US Joint Economic Committee, 91st
Congress, First Session, The Analysis and Evaluation of
Public Expenditure: The PPB System, Vol. 1
(Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office,
1969), pp. 59-73.
Arrow, Kenneth J., "Control in large organizations,"
Management Science, Vol. 10, No. 3 (April 1964), pp.
397-408.
Ben-Ner, A., J. C. Brada, and E. Neuberger, ''The structure
and behavior of economic organizations: Theoretical
and empirical perspectives," Journal of Comparative
Economics, Vol. 17, No.2 (June 1993), pp. 201-206.
Ben-Ner, A., J. M. Montias, and E. Neuberger, "Basic
issues in organizations: A comparative perspective,"
Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 17, No. 2
(June 1993), pp. 207-242.
Boserup, Ester, Women's Role in Economic Development
(London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1971).
Brusco, S., "The Emilian model: Productive decentralization and social integration," Cambridge Journal of
Economics, Vol. 6, No.2 (June 1982), pp. 167-184.
Callaway, A., "From traditional crafts to modem industries," in P. C. Lloyd, A. L. Mahogunje, and B. Awe
(Eds.), The City of Ibadan (London: Cambridge
University Press, 1967), pp. 153-171.
Capecchi, V., "The informal economy and the development
of flexible specialization in Emilia-Romagna," in A.
Portes, M. Castells, and L. A. Benton (Eds.), The
Informal Economy: Studies in Advanced and Less
Developed Countries (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1989), pp. 189-215.
Coase, Ronald H., "The problem of social cost," Journal of
Law and Economics, Vol. 3 (October 1960), pp. 1-44.
Coase, Ronald H., "The nature of the firm," Economica,
Vol. 4 (November 1937), pp. 386-405.
Doeringer, P. B., "Internal labor markets and noncompeting
groups," American Economic Review, Vol. 76, No. 2
(May 1986), pp. 48-52.
Eicher, Carl, and Doyle C. Baker, Research on Agricultural
Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Criitical
Surv,ey, MSU International Development Paper (East
Lansing, MI: Michigan State University, 1982).
Ekpenyong, S., "Development and the operation of the
urban informal sector in Port Harcourt and Calabar,"
Comparative Urban Research, Vol. 10, No. 2 (1985),
pp. 21-32.
Eluagu, Lambert Sunday, "Inter and intra state trade on
root crops: A study of yarn collection and distribution

processes," Ph.D. Dissertation (Ibadan, Nigeria:
University of Ibadan, 1988).
Greenwald, G., and Joseph E. Stiglitz, "Pareto inefficiency
of market economies: Search and efficiency wage models," American Economic Review, Vol. 78, No. 2 (May
1988), pp. 351-355.
Greenwald, G., and Joseph E. Stiglitz, "Externalities in
economies with imperfect information and incomplete
markets," Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 101,
No.2 (May 1986), pp. 229-265.
Gusten, R., Studies in the Staple Food Economy of Western
Nigeria (Munich: Weltforum Verlag and the Nigerian
Institute of Social and Economic Research, 1968).
Hart, K., "Informal income opportunities and urban
employment in Ghana," Journal of Modern African
Studies, Vol. 11, No. 1 (March 1973), pp. 61-91.
Hay, Margaret, and Sharon Stichter (Eds.), African Women
South of the Sahara (New York: Longman, 1984).
Heimberger, P. G., "Cooperative enterprise as a structural
dimension of farm markets," Journal of Farm
Economics, Vol. 46, No.3 (August 1964), pp. 603-617.
Hodder, B. W., "The markets of Ibadan," in P. C. Lloyd, A.
L. Mahogunje, and B. Awe (Eds.), The City of Ibadan
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), pp.
173-190.
House, W. J., "Nairobi's informal sector: Dynamic entrepreneurs or surplus labor?", Economic Development
and Cultural Change, Vol. 32, No. 2 (January 1984),
pp. 277-303.
Hugon, P., "The informal sector revisited (in Africa)," in D.
Turnham, B. Salome, and A. Schwarz (Eds.), The
Informal Sector Revisited (Paris: OECD Development
Centre, 1990), pp. 70-87.
Ibadan Foodstuff Sellers' Association, "The Constitution,"
Mimeo (Ibadan, Nigeria: IFSA, undated).
International Labour Office, Employment, Incomes, and
Equality: A Strategy For Increasing Productive
Employment in Kenya (Geneva: ILO, 1972).
International Labour Office - Jobs and Skills Program for
Africa (ILO-JASPA), The Informal Sector in Africa
(Addis Ababa: ILO, 1985).
Jagannathan, N. V., Informal Markets in Developing
Countries (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).
Jones, W. 0., Marketing Staple Food Crops in Tropical
Africa (London: Cornell University Press, Ltd., 1972).
King, K., "Research, policy, and the informal sector:
African experience," in D. Turnham, B. Salome, and A.
Schwarz (Eds.), The Informal Sector Revisited (Paris:
OECD Development Centre, 1990a), pp. 131-149.
King, K., "Emerging trends in Africa: A briefing note for
new studies," in D. Turnham, B. Salome, and A.
Schwarz (Eds.), The Informal Sector Revisited (Paris:
OECD Development Centre, 1990b), pp. 187-202.
Lipsey, R. G., and Kelvin Lancaster, "The general theory of
second best," Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 24, No.
63 (1956-57), pp. 11-33.

CARTELS IN AN "NTH-BEST" WORLD

to Nigeria
correcting

, Nigeria:

rrefficiency
wage mod~o. 2 (May

nalities in
incomplete
Vol. 101,

ofWestem
e Nigerian
~68).

J.nd urban
rn African
-91.
an Women
~84).

1 structural

of Farm
. 603-617.
. Lloyd, A.
of Ibadan
1967), pp.

mic entrevelopment
ary 1984),

ica),"in D.
~ds.), The
velopment

1stitution,"

omes, and
roductive

rogram for

·in Africa

eve/oping
1987).
'!Tropical

1.,1972).
tal sector:
me, and A.
ted (Paris:
-149.
tg note for
e, and A.
ted (Paris:
-202.
J theory of
ol.24, No.

Lubell, Harold, The Informal Sector In The 1980s and
1990s (Paris: OECD Development Centre, 1991).
Meade, James E., Trade and Welfare: Mathematical
Supplement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1955).
Nihan, G., "Le secteur non structure, signification, aire
d'extension du concept et application experimentale,"
Tiers Monde, Vol. 21, No. 82 (April/June 1980), pp.
261-284.
Nweke, F., and Lynam Prudencio, "Status of data on cassava in major producing countries in Africa," Working
Paper #3 (Ibadan, Nigeria: Collaborative Study on
Cassava in Africa, International Institute for Tropical
Agriculture, 1989).
Nweke, F., and Okorji, Njoku King, Elasticities of Demand
for Major Food Items in a Root and Tuber Food
System: Emphasis on Yam in Southeast Nigeria
(lbadan, Nigeria: International Institute for Tropical
Agriculture, 1991).
Onokerhoraye, A. G., "Occupational specialization by ethnic groups in the informal sector of the urban
economies of traditional Nigerian cities: The case of
Benin," African Studies Review, Vol. 20, No. 1 (April
1977), pp. 53-69.
Papanek, G., "The poor of Jakarta," Economic
Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 24, No. 1
(October 1975), pp. 1-17.
Purvis, M., "The development of cooperative retailing in
England and Wales, 1851-1901: A geographical
study," Journal of Historical Geography, Vol. 16, No .
3 (1990), pp. 314-331.
Sethuraman, S. V., The Urban Informal Sector in
Developing Countries: Employment, Poverty, and
Environment (Geneva: ILO, 1981).
Spradley, James P., The Ethnographic Interview (New
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1979).
Sudarkasa, Niara, Where Women Work: A Study of Yoruba

335

Women in the Marketplace (Ann Arbor, MI: The
University of Michigan Press, 1973).
Stiglitz, Joseph E., "Government, financial markets, and
economic development," Working Paper #3669
(Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic
Research, 1991).
Trager, Lillian, "Rural-urban linkages: The role of small
urban centres in Nigeria," African Studies Review, Vol.
31, No.3 (December 1988), pp. 29-38.
Trager, Lillian, "A re-examination of the urban informal
sector in West Africa," Canadian Journal of African
Studies, Vol. 21, No.2 (1987), pp. 238-255.
Trager, Lillian, "From yams to beer in a Nigerian City:
Expansion and change in informal sector trade activity," in Stuart Plattner (Ed.), Markets and Marketing:
Monographs in Economic Anthropology, No. 4
(Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1985), pp.
259-285.
Trager, Lillian, "Customers and creditors: Variations in
economic personalism in a Nigerian marketing system,"
Ethnology, Vol. 20 (1981), pp. 133-146.
Trager, Lillian, "Yoruba markets and trade: Analysis of
spatial structure and social organization in the Ijesaland
marketing system," Ph.D. Dissertation (Seattle:
University of Washington, 1976).
Turnham, D., B. Salome, and A. Schwarz (Eds.), The
Informal Sector Revisited (Paris: OECD Development
Centre, 1990).
Williamson, Oliver E., Economic Organization: Firms,
Markets, and Policy Control (New York: New York
University Press, 1986).
Williamson, Oliver E., The Economic Institutions of
Capitalism (New York: The Free Press, 1985).
World Bank, "Issues in informal finance," World
Development Report 1989 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1989), pp. 112-121.

